Having failed to offer a valid excuse as to why they waited approximately six months to inform their insurance agent of the occurrence ( see Paramount Ins.
In the present case, the evidence established that the plaintiffs should have realized that there was a reasonable possibility of the subject policy's involvement once they learned about the accident and its surrounding circumstances. Furthermore, knowledge of an occurrence obtained by an agent charged with the duty to report such matters is imputed to the principal ( see White v City of New York, supra at 958). However, the duty to give notice arises "when, from the information available relative to the accident, an insured could glean a reasonable possibility of the policy's involvement" ( Paramount Ins. Co., 213 AD2d 453 Argentina v Otsego Mut. The burden is on the insured to show the reasonableness of its belief, and whether that belief is reasonable is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact ( see United Talmudical Academy of Kiryas Joel v Cigna Prop.
v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 NY2d 436 United Talmudical Academy of Kiryas Joel v Cigna Prop. However, a failure to give notice may be excused when an insured has a reasonable belief of nonliability ( see White v City of New York, supra at 957-958 Security Mut. v Napolitano, 232 AD2d 561, 562 Greater N.Y. Co., 78 NY2d 1054, 1055 Matter of Interboro Mut. Absent a showing of legal justification, the failure to comply with the notice condition vitiates coverage ( see Matter of Allcity Ins. Group, 300 AD2d 176, 178 Pierre v Providence Wash. Generally, the requirement that an insured provide notice of any occurrence to the insurance company within a reasonable time is considered a condition precedent to the insurer's obligation to defend or indemnify the insured ( see White v City of New York, 81 NY2d 955, 957 Brooks v Zurich-Am. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the defendant New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company is not obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiffs in the underlying action.
2348/99, the defendants Rosemary Springer and Joseph Springer appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Dolan, J.), dated September 10, 2002, which granted the motion of the defendant New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company for summary judgment. Realty of Dutchess, pending in the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, under Index No. In an action for a judgment declaring that the defendant New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company is obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiffs in an underlying action entitled Springer v C.C.R. New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Respondent, and Rosemary Springer et al., Appellants. Realty of Dutchess, Inc., et al., Respondents, Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.Īs corrected through Wednesday, January 28, 2004Ĭ.C.R.
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